T. J. Smiley; XII.—Entailment and Deducibility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 233–254, https://doi.org/10.1093.

The title of T. J. Mawson's article was incorrectly given as “God's creation of mortality” on the Contents page and cover. The publishers would like to apologise to the author and their readers for this error.

There are more philosophy teachers alive today than existed from Socrates until 1900, and this year alone there will be more "contact hours" in philosophical wisdom than in the two millenia before Descartes. One might legitimately wonder what is done with all that time and why the world is not immensely better for it. The first, if not the second, of these questions is addressed and answered in this serious, thorough and much-needed collection of essays. Eduard Fey, founder and long (...) the president of the International Society for Teachers of Philosophy, and a dozen coworkers have surveyed the historical background and present-day structure of philosophical instruction in every country of Western Europe—in sixteen essays, some as long as fifty pages, some as brief as five pages. The volume is thorough. One can learn, for example, exactly what a gymnasium senior in Luxembourg studies during his weekly three hours of philosophy. One can learn how Hans Richert tried to reform high school instruction in Germany in 1925, only to be opposed by the Catholic hierarchy’s insistence that metaphysical questions be treated only in religious instruction, or how the German Idealist Krause influenced Spanish pedagogy through his student Julian Sanz del Rio, and so on. Given the range and detail of the material, the lack of an index to the volume is keenly felt. (shrink)

This first volume of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe reprints his 1972 collection of the same title, but with some additions. The 1972 edition contained three works: his doctoral dissertation on "The Theory of Judgment in Psychologism", the habilitation work on "Duns Scotus’s Theory of Categories and Meaning", and the lecture on "The Concept of Time in Historical Science". The present volume adds the article "The Problem of Reality in Modern Philosophy" and the long review "New Research on Logic," both from 1912, as (...) well as shorter book reviews from 1913-14. The new volume also prints eleven notes—none of them of great importance—which the young Heidegger jotted down in the margins of the original publications. Perhaps the note on "das Gelten" on p. 166 is the most useful. The title pages reproduce Heidegger’s handwritten dedication of the Gesamtausgabe to his wife, as well as the subtitle he gave to the entire endeavor a few days before he died: "Wege—nicht Werke," "Pathways—not Works.". (shrink)

Knowledge of God takes the form of a debate between Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley. Plantinga opens the batting with a seventy-page laying out of his case ‘that theism has a significant epistemic virtue: if it is true, it is warranted; this is a virtue naturalism emphatically lacks’ . Indeed, Plantinga argues that ‘if naturalism were true, there would be no such thing as knowledge’ . It will be recalled [e.g. Plantinga and Plantinga ] that Plantinga's position is that (...) warrant, understood as whatever it is that needs to be added to true belief to …. (shrink)

Preview: /Review: Satoshi Higuchi, Somaesthetics and the Philosophy of Culture: Projects in Japan (New York, NY; Oxford, England: Routledge, 2021), 138 pages./ Satoshi Higuchi’s Somaesthetics and the Philosophy of Culture is a succinct and innovative work in aesthetics and philosophy of education, despite what the title may otherwise imply. Indeed, the title may be the only shortcoming in this work, for it does not convey the scope of the concepts covered. It may be better titled Somaesthetics and the Philosophy of (...) Education, but even this does not express the important and fascinating discussions on the aesthetics of sports contained herein; and “education” is perhaps too narrow to encompass the range of application of the ideas (especially in the final part of the book). However, when the reader looks past the title, they will find a nicely organized work introducing readers to the topic of the aesthetics of sport, its application for improving pedagogy, and several avenues for further development in these areas. Higuchi’s previous work is a tireless series of granting legitimacy to the study of sports. Somaesthetics and the Philosophy of Culture is another important step in this project. Readers need not be familiar with Richard Shusterman’s multidisciplinary project of somaesthetics for, when it is necessary, Higuchi provides the relevant details. Readers who are familiar with somaesthetics will very quickly see how the ideas here complement it well. (shrink)

The editors welcome letters from readers, although we cannot guarantee that all will be published. To ensure timeliness, correspondents must respond to an article within seven weeks and not exceed two double‐spaced pages. Letters become the property of the editors and may be edited and shortened at our discretion.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Memory in Augustine’s Theological Anthropology by Paige E. HochschildJoseph T. Lienhard, S.J.Memory in Augustine’s Theological Anthropology. By Paige E. Hochschild. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 251. $125.00 (cloth). ISBN 978-0-19-964302-8.When students of St. Augustine consider his teaching on memory, they turn instinctively to the Confessions, book 10, and to On the Trinity, books 11 and 12. The lyrical passage in the Confessions is easy to teach and (...) intriguing in its contents. Paige Hochschild paints a much larger picture, drawing on far more sources. She also sees memory as a central category in Augustine’s thought. In the opening paragraph of the introduction, she describes memory (for Augustine) as the way the mind meets the world, as the way things external to the body are apprehended, as the way intelligible objects are known, and as what it means to be constituted in the image of God. This is a big order. And “order,” in Augustine’s sense, is key: the mind, as memory, brings order to the natural world, but also brings to light a providential order that is implicit in the sensible.The book is divided into three parts: (1) the philosophical tradition (Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus), (2) Augustine’s earlier writings (from the Cassiciacum dialogues up to De magistro and De musica), and (3) the Confessions and De trinitate. The conclusion of this complex study is that memory is salvific: it accounts for the soul’s progress by the dialectical play of the knowledge and love of what is possessed, yet not possessed. The lifelong process of healing in which memory functions is fulfilled in contemplation.Two characteristics of Hochschild’s book can be mentioned at the outset. First, she studies each author diachronically, measuring progress and growth in the author’s thought, and particularly in his understanding of memory. Second, she readily invokes a wide range of categories to explain and illuminate her main topic. The book is anything but an extended encyclopedia article on “memoria in Augustine.” The two principal terms in the title, “memory” and “theological anthropology,” are richly developed and elaborated.Chapter 1 begins with a short note on Augustine’s knowledge of Plato. It is generally admitted that Augustine read some of the dialogues of Plato in translation: the Timaeus, the Republic (albeit only parts of it), the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus. Some of these works, at least, may have come down to him through doxographers. But Plato’s influence on Augustine remains shadowy. It is “Platonism,” and particularly Plotinus, that influences him so clearly, a point made memorably in Confessions 7.9.13-15, and its intriguing reference to the libri Platonicorum. Before all else, Platonism delivers Augustine from the bondage of materialism.Hochschild treats Plato’s doctrine of memory under four headings: sense perception, knowledge as recollection, divisions in the ways of knowing, and the practice of dialectic. In regard to sense perception, the sharp distinction (found in the Republic) between opinion (doxa) and knowledge (epistêmê) [End Page 144] needs to be refined, Hochschild avers. At least in some later works, the sensible is an image of the intelligible, and hence some sense perception can be infallible. On the next topic, Plato invokes recollection to explain direct apprehension of the forms, but recollection does not recall what was perceived in the past but is a restoration of a clear, logical relationship. The Republic introduces a new element, “the illuminative power of the Good” (21). The final section of chapter 1 treats dialectic, concluding that “knowledge is fulfilled in virtue, and the art of dialectic is not merely an exercise in definition, but a hexis, and a way of living” (27).Chapter 2, on Aristotle, begins with the observation that, if Plato’s influence on Augustine was indirect, Aristotle’s was even more indirect, reaching Augustine through Plotinus. Most familiar, of course, are Augustine’s account of reading Aristotle’s Categories during his days at Carthage (Confessions 4.16.28-31) and his later use of the categories of substance and relation in his understanding of the Trinity, creating the category of “substantial relation,” which would... (shrink)

The editors welcome letters from readers, although we cannot guarantee that all will be published. To ensure timeliness, correspondents must respond to an article within seven weeks and not exceed two double‐spaced pages. Letters become the property of the editors and may be edited and shortened at our discretion.

The objective of the new series, "Molecular Biology, Biochemistry and Biophysics", of which this brochure forms the first volume, is to produce more than another compilation of data. It is hoped that the new series will help the individual "specialist" keep abreast of important developments in the natural sciences at the molecular and subcellular level in fields complementary to his own. The predominant aim is not so much to increase the ever-growing body of information in an encyclopedic fashion but rather (...) to give, in addition to a well rounded factual presentation of subjects which have reached a degree of maturation, a leitmotiv developed by the individual authors from a more personal point of view. The reader should thus be able to use these mono graphs not only for acquisition of knowledge but as a source of further motiva tion in his own work. This latter and more consequential aim of the monograph series is one of the reasons for presenting here a most unusual talk which should enable the reader to sit back and view his own efforts in the context of science and creative attempts as a whole. The lecture is the virtually unknown inaugural address of the Dutch physical chemist JACOBUS HENRICUS VAN'T HOFF. As is shown in his short biography presented on pages 3 and 4 the principal thoughts of the molecular biologist of today are akin to his own and he clearly recognized the universality of molecular life processes. (shrink)

Commentary on: Olaf Blanke, Thomas Metzinger, Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Volume 13, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 7-13, ISSN 1364-6613, DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003.

A mammoth labor, this work offers us for the first time in a definitive English edition those notes grouped together and published in 1901 by Nietzsche's sister under the title, Der Wille zur Macht. In his Introduction Kaufmann disputes with good reason Karl Schlechta's claim that "The Will to Power contains nothing new, nothing that could surprise anyone who knows everything Nietzsche published." There are many new things in this work—of particular interest are the discussion of European nihilism in Book (...) One and the "Critique of the 'Good Man'" in Book Two. In addition to an illuminating introduction, there are eight pages of facsimile manuscripts.—J. T. (shrink)

Two new Kaufmann translations together with five pages of related correspondence and a helpful bibliographical appendix. Although as Kaufmann admits, his translation of The Birth of Tragedy owes much to the earlier Clifton Fadiman rendition, he has clearly produced the definitive translation of these two works for English readers. The translator's notes and introductions are consistently helpful. By no stretch of the imagination could these two works be considered central to the Nietzschean corpus, while central works like The Dawn or (...) The Gay Science exist in English only in mediocre, pre-World War I translations. Hopefully, Kaufmann will now turn his considerable talents as a translator in this direction.—J. T. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Research Program at the National Human Genome Research InstituteEric M. Meslin (bio), Elizabeth J. Thomson (bio), and Joy T. Boyer (bio)Organizers of the Human Genome Project (HGP) understood from the beginning that the scientific activities of mapping and sequencing the human genome would raise ethical, legal, and social issues that would require careful attention by scientists, health care professionals, government officials, and the (...) public. The establishment of the ELSI (ethical, legal, and social implications) programs at the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) and the Department of Energy (DOE) was thought to be vital to the success of the HGP in the United States. It also provided a novel approach to the simultaneous study of ethical, legal, and social issues and basic scientific issues. Eric Juengst, the first director of the ELSI program, described its origins in a previous issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (Juengst 1991). Now in its seventh year, the ELSI program has accomplished much. This article summarizes the evolution and goals of the ELSI program at NHGRI, outlines the program’s current research priorities with examples of activities within each priority area, and provides a look to the future, including the initiation of a strategic planning process.Evolution and Goals of the ELSI Research ProgramThe HGP’s “genomic” goals are unique: to map and sequence the entire human genome—some 3 billion base pairs that make up approximately 80–100,000 genes—and the genomes of related model organisms by the year 2005. This goal was particularly ambitious since, when it was proposed, the technologies for mapping and sequencing had yet to be developed. When the HGP was first established, its organizers also elaborated a set of ELSI goals, which they saw as vital to the success of the genome project. The original ELSI goals were: (1) to anticipate and address the implications of the HGP for individuals and society and (2) to examine the ELSI consequences of mapping and sequencing the human genome in order to stimulate public discussion. To meet these goals, the NHGRI created its ELSI research program in 1990. Along with mapping, sequencing, [End Page 291] and mammalian genetics, ELSI was one of four original branches in the NHGRI Division of Extramural Research that funded research in those areas. Although the individual “branches” no longer exist, the mechanisms for funding research remain much the same. While the overall goals of the program have not changed, the specific ways of achieving the goals have continued to evolve. The importance of the ELSI program lies not in the collection of a full set of data that will be valuable in and of itself, but in the value of using and interpreting this new set of information.Early on, the NHGRI described a set of somewhat more specific goals: (1) to develop a program to help understand the ethical, legal, and social implications of the human genome project and (2) to identify and define the major issues of concern and develop policy options to address them. These more specific goals have been largely met. As the most recent biennial NHGRI Progress Report notes, “a robust ELSI research and education program has been established, many of the most urgent ELSI issues have been identified, and many policy options to address these issues have been proposed” (NCHGR 1995, p. 21). Between 1990 and 1996, ELSI provided more than $32.5 million in funding through 128 research and education grants in more than 30 states and in Canada (Table 1). The ELSI research budget is unique in that when originally created, it was specifically tied to the amount of money provided for the overall NHGRI budget. The NHGRI originally devoted 3 percent of its extramural budget to fund ELSI projects, but in FY 1991, it increased the ELSI budget to 5 percent, a figure that remains today. Table 2 lists the expenditures for each fiscal year since 1990 and the cumulative expenditures to date. The ELSI research budget at NHGRI this year will be about $7 million. When other sources of funding—e.g., co-funding arrangements with other institutes and agencies and the funding of ELSI... (shrink)

Since the publication of my "Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An _Active Perception_ Approach to Conscious Mental Content,", a good deal of published material has appeared or has come to my attention that either provides additional support for the Perceptual Activity Theory PA theory) of mental imagery presented in ATOITOI, or that throws further doubt on the rival theories that are criticized there. Other relevant evidence was not mentioned in ATOITOI because I lacked the space for a proper (...) explanation of its relevance. I hope eventually to write and publish a new account of " PA " theory, that will make use of much of this material. In the meantime this page provides citations to the "new" support, and discussion sections that briefly explain the relevance of the cited material. Quite apart from presenting new lines of supporting evidence and argument, I hope this page will help to clarify many aspects of. (shrink)

The first English translation of three essays on contemporary drama penned by Kierkegaard in the mid-1840's. The most substantial essay, "The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress," takes as its point of departure Johanna Luise Heiberg's performance as Juliet in a production staged at the Royal Theatre on January 23, 1847. Some 19 years earlier Fru Heiberg had played the same role on the same stage as a girl of fifteen, and Kierkegaard's essay considers some of (...) the ironies and tensions of this juxtaposition. The 56 page introduction by Stephen Crites is perceptive and consistently illuminating as a portrait of the life situation out of which the essays grew. The translation is readable while preserving a thoroughly Kierkegaardian flavor, and the notes are revealing and to the point. Altogether, this volume might be taken as a model of how to present Kierkegaard's minor works in English.—J. T. (shrink)

By pointing out parallels between Kierkegaard's thought and that of the eighteenth century "Dunkers," the author seeks to offer a case for twentieth century "Neo-Sectarianism." As he points out, "S. K. would be listened to where Menno Simons and Alexander Mock would not." Eller leaves no doubt of his devotion to Kierkegaard studies, pointing out on the dedication page that he has named one of his sons Enten Eller--a phrase which in Danish means "Either/or" and which was the title (...) of Kierkegaard's masterwork, Enten-Eller.--J. T. (shrink)

The editor of this text has brought together fifteen selections representing some of the major contributions philosophers have made to the study of the aims of education. This anthology is organized into three parts: classical, modern and analytic philosophies of education. Each selection is preceded by the editor’s one page introduction, which unfortunately is far too short to prepare the student to deal technically with the material. In the part devoted to classical writings on education, texts from Plato and (...) Aristotle are offered with no regard to the cultural setting, while the excerpts from Locke, Rousseau and Kant seem to be presented principally with a concern for moral education. The five modern selections are far more interesting, particularly those from Dewey and Russell. The material from Maritain and Whitehead is preponderantly practical, though Sidney Hook’s defense of Dewey will afford the student an appreciation of careful argument. By far the most engaging part of the book is the last, comprising significant selections from Scheffler, Ryle and Jane Roland Martin. A portion of R. S. Peters’ Authority, Responsibility and Education is reprinted, but surprisingly enough, Peters’ far better book, Ethics and Education, is neglected. Cahn presents a short essay of his own, "Is There an Analytic Philosophy of Education?" which he probably would have modified had he been acquainted with Peters’ recent work. The likely use of this anthology is the teacher education course commonly referred to coincidentally by the same title. It is to Cahn’s credit that he has attempted to expose the education student to genuine philosophy, yet this anthology presents a mere mass of material without an effort at providing direction, structure or synthesis. The serious philosophical work of systematically analyzing education, culture, self and meaning still remains as much a task as it did before, though now thanks to Cahn some of the working materials for such an endeavor have been made more available.—J. T. K. (shrink)

Not long ago, I received an email from a man who had been trying to get his seven-year-old son interested in science, and teach him a little bit about the workings of the brain. He had been showing his son one of those diagrams of a brain with various regions labeled as "speech center," vision center," and the like (something similar to this, I suppose), when the little boy suddenly asked, "Daddy, which part of the brain does imagination come from?". (...) It was not on the diagram, and the father, although he studied human biology at college, realized he did not know the answer. As we do these days, he got on the internet to try to find out. It was not as easy as he might have expected. "Imagination" is certainly a word that is found on a lot of web pages, and there are plenty that seem to be devoted to celebrating or promoting it, but very few of them seem to have anything at all to say about what it is, how it works, or where in the brain it might be implemented. Eventually, he found his way to this site. Even here, however, he could find no straightforward answer to his son's apparently straightforward question. (The truth is, the question is not nearly as straightforward as it appears.) He thought I might be a good a person to ask, however, and sent me an email. What follows is a lightly revised version of the reply I sent. It is not written in terms that a seven-year-old could understand (I am not clever enough to do that), but neither is it pitched at the professional, academic level of most of the material on this site. I would like to think that it answers the question (inasmuch as it can be answered in the current state of scientific knowledge) in a way that a layperson should be able to understand, and that they might then be able to explain to a curious and intelligent child. If you want to know the detailed reasons, and see the citations to the scientific literature, that justify the claims made here, you can find them in the other articles on this site.. (shrink)

Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness” Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-20 DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0090-7 Authors J. Kevin O’Regan, Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS - Université Paris Descartes, Centre Biomédical des Saints Pères, 45 rue des Sts Pères, 75270 Paris cedex 06, France Ned Block, Departments of Philosophy, Psychology and Center for Neural Science, New York University, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA Journal Review of Philosophy and (...) Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158. (shrink)

This debate, principally between myself (Nigel Thomas) and Patrick Hayes, the well known computer scientist and Artificial Intelligence researcher, took place through the internet mailing list for the discussion of the scientific study of consciousness, PSYCHE-D (moderated by Patrick Wilken), which is associated with the on-line journal PSYCHE. The discussion touches on the various different senses in which the expression "mental image" may be used, the underlying cognitive mechanisms of imagery, and the relevance of an understanding of imagery to the (...) understanding of conscious thought, and thought in general. As the debate became rather 'unthreaded' on the list, following it through this page may help the reader to better understand what was going on. (shrink)

It is strange to write for the pages of this journal a statement which will not come under the eye of its founding editor, Sheldon Sacks. For nearly five years everything that appeared in Critical Inquiry—articles, critical responses, editorial comments—was a matter of painstaking and passionate concern to Shelly Sacks. With a flow of questions and suggestions and a talent for unabashed cajolery, he generated articles and rejoinders to those articles. He worked tirelessly in editorial consultation and correspondence with contributors, (...) especially young writers, helping them to discover the best way of giving form to their ideas. Among the essays submitted to this journal he searched eagerly, even anxiously, for those which seemed, in his words, "right for C.I." What was right for C. I. was never, for Shelly Sacks, a cut-and-dried choice. In his own intellectual life, in his teaching and writing, he delighted in arguing important general questions: theories of representation in the arts, points of possible intersection between linguistic science and literary criticism, the interplay of social forces and cultural expressions. Not surprisingly, in reconnoitering for Critical Inquiry, he found special satisfaction in identifying writers who shared his passion for reexamining fundamental topics in the intellectual disciplines. If such writers made their case forcefully, so much the better: in choosing an essay for publication he assessed its capacity to stimulate interesting counterargument. At no time, however, did Shelly Sacks confuse his own beliefs with the nature of intellectual discourse. As an editor he was hospitable to writers whose premises he questioned and whose conclusions he deplored. Nor did Shelly attempt to achieve a spurious catholicity by following a quiet quota system designed to give each major line of interpretation—deconstructionist, Marxist, psychoanalytic, what have you—an occasional airing in Critical Inquiry. For Shelly each article stood on its own ground: if its author dealt responsibly and freshly with an interesting problem, that was enough. And, along with his commitment to theoretical inquiry, he responded warmly to the personal, the offbeat, the idiosyncratic. He regarded the feature Artists on Art, for example, as a central element in our design. As an editor Sheldon Sacks was above all a shaper. He labored to find and suggest connections in the phenomena of intellectual life. Even the construction of a table of contents for a typical Critical Inquiry issue became for him an opportunity to influence the reader's experience of what we offered. The eminence of an author or the allure of a title were put to one side as Shelly sought to orchestrate, through placement, a kind of intellectual counterpoint from one essay to another. Unheard melodies, doubtless, for many of us, but for Shelly real and sustaining. In this valedictory note we have spoken of Sheldon Sacks' editorial accomplishment—in our friendly view, a very distinguished one—rather than of the personal qualities which made working alongside him an exhilarating experience. We should report, however, that for more than half the life of this journal Shelly was ill and knew that the time available to him was likely to be relatively brief. Faced with this diminishing perspective, he did not—indeed it is more accurate to say he could not—moderate his involvement with the life of this journal. At his death, as at the launching of this enterprise, he held to the high ambition that Critical Inquiry encourage comeliness, vigor, and continuity in the discourse of our time. The appropriate "critical response" to this great loss is that Sheldon Sacks’ editorial colleagues, and our publisher, the University of Chicago Press, pledge whatever talents and energies we possess to the continuing life of the journal he imagined and brought into being. (shrink)

J P White; The Aims of Education: three legacies of the British idealists, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 12, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 5–12, http.

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page W12-W13.

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS; also called motor neuron disease) is a devastating medical condition that progressively robs patients of their ability to move, speak and eventually breathe. At present, many physicians are hesitant to propose tracheostomy and respiratory support in the terminal phase of ALS. In accordance with the principle of patient autonomy, physicians should respect the right of the ALS patient to accept or refuse any treatment, including mechanical ventilation. Also, in environments where euthanasia or physician-assisted death is legal, (...) such requests can be acceptable. At least two conditions are necessary for full autonomy. To have a claim on full autonomy, people need to have intact cognitive abilities, and to exercise this right they must be able to communicate. In the past, the first condition was in doubt (indeed, overlap with other neurodegenerative diseases is sometimes suspected and some patients with ALS are thought to have associated frontotemporal dementia) and the second was severely compromised in patients with devastating motor impairment (communication being limited to the twitch of a finger or the blink of an eye). In this issue of J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry, Lakerveld and colleagues1 investigated cognition in 11 patients with late stage ALS (see page 25). They showed preserved cognitive functioning (ie, language, executive function, intelligence, learning and long term memory) compared with healthy controls. Assessments were exclusively based on a ‘‘yes–no’’ response mode. Because of the absence of verbal and motor communication, the neuropsychological assessment of these patients is complicated, and adapted testing is needed. By using a ‘‘yes–no’’ response mode based on the remaining motor abilities of the patient, this study proves the possibility of assessing patients with minimal motor capacities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Su irez NORMAN j. WELLS IT HAS LONG BEEN ACKNOWLEDGEDthat Francisco Sufirez's distinction between a formal and an objective concept exercised some influence upon Descartes's teaching on 'idea'.' It would appear, however, that not enough attention has been given to that distinction of Sufirez (and especially to another to be mentioned shordy) to aid in dispelling what I take to be (...) a widespread confusion and misunderstanding with regard to 'idea' in Descartes, especially with respect to 'idea' taken 'objectively'. Much, if not all, of the confusion in question has to do with Descartes's admittedly equivocal use of the term 'idea'. For he had allowed that 'idea' could be taken 'materially' (materialiter), on the one hand, for the knowing activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it could be taken 'objectively' (objective) for the thing (res) represented by that knowing activity.' At this point, the contemporary reader can only be brought up short, See E. Gilson, Index scolastico-cart~sien (New York: Burt Franklin Reprint, 1912), 48-49; Discours de la m~thode: Texte et commentazre (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 321; G. Rodis-Lewisin her edition of Meditationes de Prima PhRosoph.m (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953), 41 n. 1; L'oeuure de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1971), 53~ n. 8; J. Collins, Modern European Philosophy (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1954), 165;T.J. Cronin, S.J., Objecttve Being m Descartes and SuArez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966); "Objective Reality of Ideas in Human Thought: Descartes and Su~rez," Wisdom in Depth: Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, SJ., eds. V. F. Daues, S.J., M. R. Holloway, S.J., L. Sweeney, S.J. (Milwaukee : Bruce, 1966), 68-79; L. Gilen, S.J., "Uber die Beziehungen Descartes zur zeitgenossischen Scholastik," Scholastik 32 (1957): 41-66; R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la th~orie cart6sienne de l'&re objectif," Revue d'histoire de la philosophic 3 (1929): 464-72;J. Owens, C.S.S.R., in The Cambridge HtstoU of Later Medu,val Philosophy, eds. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 459; G. Nuchelmans,Judgment and Propositwnfrom Descartesto Kant (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1983), 36-54. " Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery, 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1897-19o9; hereafter cited according to volume, page and line), Praefatio ad Lectorem, 7: 8. 19-251 "Sed respondeo hic subesse aequivocationem in voce ideae: sumi enim potest vel materialiter, pro operatione intellectus, quo sensu me perfectior dici nequit, vel objective, pro re per istam operationem repraesentata, quae res, etsi non supponatur extra intellectum existere, potest tamen me esse perfectior ratione suae essentiae." It is clear that two realities are to be causally accounted for. The [33] 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28"1 JANUARY 1990 conditioned as we are by an appreciation of 'objectivity' altogether extramental! It makes for a considerable wrench of perspective to do justice to Descartes's acknowledged doctrine of intramental objectivity and an intramental 'thing represented' (resrepraesentata). 'Idea', then, in traditional Cartesian fashion, designates the act of representing as well as the 'thing represented '. S Yet, for all this, and despite repeated expressions of the same doctrine, there is a persistent tendency in the history of Cartesianism and its scholarship to interpret 'idea' taken 'objectively' as in some way representative. Contrary to what I take to be Descartes's constant position, such a rendering unwittingly transfers that function which is proper to the cognitive activity, mind is the efficient cause of its cognitive activity. With respect to ideas taken 'objectively', such as the ideas of God and the triangle on the levels of metaphysical and mathematical intelligibility, an efficient cause, extrinsic to the mind, is certainly at issue. For here we are in the presence of what is independent of the mind, however intramental it may be. On the triangle, see Medit. 5; 7: 64. ]4s7 : "...est tamen profecto determinata quaedam ejus natura, sire essentia, sive forma, immutabUis et aeterna, quae a me non efficta est, nec a mente mea dependet." For the idea of God, see Medit. 5; 7: 68. l o-12: "Nam sane multis modis inteUigo illam [ideam... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosopher’s Seduction: Hume and the Fair SexVicki J. SappFollowing the failed reception of his Treatise David Hume turned to writing essays and published these in various editions throughout his career. Among the first offerings were essays addressing “the female reader,” “the ladies,” or “the fair sex” in that current habit which Jonathan Swift labelled “fair-sexing it.” Hume’s Victorian editors T. H. Green and T. H. Grose classified and (...) commented upon these woman-appeal essays “apparently designed to attract the attention of ladies, and marked by the mannerisms of what was then a fashionable literature,” concluding that these “can hardly have been much to their writer’s taste, and... mingle strangely with a series of discussions on the British Constitution.” 1 Green and Grose refer to the fact that Hume gradually eliminated his woman-appeal essays from the editions; today, we find these “literary” texts safely removed from the “moral and political” frame and anthologized as “Essays Withdrawn and Unpublished” in the two modern editions of Hume’s essays. 2Following Hume’s apparent cue, the critical tradition has paid little heed to the woman-appeal essays except in those cases where kind neglect has given over to insult or factionalism. From the former category we find contemporary readers such as M. A. Box who in his rhetorical analysis of Hume’s opus echoes earlier judgments of these essays as frivolous, mercenary, essentially devoid of substantive or stylistic worth—and most certainly unphilosophical. In the latter case, scattered commentators from the 1970s and 1980s reflecting those decades’ gynocritical trend built cases for Hume’s “sexism” (primarily) or “feminism” (most notably the philosopher Annette Baier). And Jerome Christensen has attended to Hume’s female reader in his [End Page 1] elaborate theoretical play with Hume’s gender as a metaphor for his literary ambitions. 3What is curious is that each of the above readers has passed over the woman-appeal essays in favor of Hume’s “serious” writing (for example, Treatise, Book III, Part II, sect. xii, “Of Chastity and Modesty”) or his letters, even though the rejected woman-appeal essays are obviously rich sources for a study of Hume’s gender perspectives. It is true that in “Of Chastity and Modesty” Hume offers what is perhaps his best evidence of society’s conventional as opposed to metaphysical foundations, in his argument that the laws of chastity governing female education and behavior are certainly “notions... founded on the public interest,” that is, patriarchal property interest. In the woman-appeal essays Hume actually works out, by illustration, the gender-biased foundational intricacies of his social contract philosophy, especially the importance of education to the regulation of society: “As publick praise and blame encrease our esteem for justice; so private education and instruction contribute to the same effect.... For these reasons [parents] are induc’d to inculcate on their children, from the earliest infancy, the principles of probity, and teach them to regard the observance of these rules, by which society is maintain’d, as worthy and honourable, and their violation as base and infamous.” 4The rejected woman-appeal essays include titles that bespeak a focus on gender, education, and social formation (“Of Love and Marriage,” “Of Moral Prejudice”), as well as titles that appear more public or scholarly: “Of Essay Writing,” “Of the Study of History.” In spite of their topical neutrality or marginally “political” tone, these latter two I identify as Hume’s core woman-appeal essays. In them Hume brings the female reader into the spotlight, inviting her into a dialogue with the male philosopher-essayist; she is to share in a sort of Humean Utopia of gender-mixed educated, genteel company servicing the ends of true philosophy in the marriage of intellection and experience. As overt appeals to “women of Sense and Education” featuring some gestures towards gender equality, these essays, one suspects, were doomed to eventual rejection by both Hume and a subsequent critical tradition prone to the kneejerk devaluation of woman-appeal.I offer here evidence that the rejected essays do have “philosophical” merit as they take up or dramatize core ideas of Treatise philosophy. These essays also feature some... (shrink)

T W Moore; Punishment and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 1, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 29–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1967.t.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Place of the Money Bag in the Secular-Mendicant Controversy at ParisRobert J. Karris O.F.M. (bio)Money bag, money bag. So many Bible-reading Christians don't know of your existence. In their defense I note that you are only mentioned twice in the entire New Testament: John 12:6 and 13:29. If faithful Bible-reading Christians don't know of your existence, what is your fate among the faithful who are less than faithful?! (...) Is ignorance truly bliss?New Testament ScholarsMoney bag, money bag. Perhaps, New Testament scholars are the reason why you are almost unknown among Christians.1 Commentators on John's Gospel give you a passing notice, if that.2 Even when they make mention of you, they [End Page 21] generally don't integrate your existence with other features of John's theology or life situation.3 As for the Jesus Seminar, its members sweep you into the dustbin of history along with 99.9% of John's Gospel.4 You see, you are deemed unhistorical. A couple of scholars involved in the quest for the historical Jesus say "Hi!" to you, but then go on with more important matters.5 Other scholars involved in the application [End Page 22] of social science methodology to the study of the New Testament opine that you were kept as a security measure and contained money to pay for the annual temple tax and such like obligations, but then they hold their peace.6Money bag, money bag. Scholars who have investigated the theme of rich and poor in the New Testament hardly give [End Page 23] you a second glance. You do not play a leading role in their general conclusions.7So, money bag, we have to take leave of New Testament scholarship if we are going to make your acquaintance on a serious level.The Middle AgesFrancis of AssisiAs we move into the Middle Ages, we ask: Did St. Francis of Assisi provide us with guidance on how to treat you with the respect that you, O money bag, so richly deserve? You see, some scholars maintain that John's Gospel was most important to Francis's worldview.8 However, Francis doesn't seem to see the problem you created for his all-consuming embrace of Jesus' missionary command of traveling with no money.9 [End Page 24] Surely Francis knows of your existence, for he refers to you in his Fourth Admonition n. 3:And the more they (superiors) are perturbed about their superiorship being taken from them than they would be over the loss of the office of washing feet, so much the more do they collect for themselves a money bag (John 12:6; 13:29) to the peril of their souls.10Francis is heir to a Benedictine spiritualization of the money bag. See how Roger the Abbot in his Sermo in ultima cena employs the money bag:Woe, how many money bags, woe, how many purses are in the monasteries of St. Benedict! Woe, how many cowls, which cover the ears of the tonsured, enclose private supplies of the mind, the money bag of one's own will, the purse of murmuring, detraction, idleness, pride, envy, jealousy, and bad will! But remember, most beloved brothers, that those who do such things follow Judas the traitor. And therefore, unless you amend your lives, you will not possess the kingdom of God.11O money bag, so Francis goes his merry way, apparently ignorant of your true meaning and leaves the problems created by your existence to his learned followers such as Bonaventure of Bagnoregio. To Bonaventure we now turn, but do so through his responses to his secular opponents, William of Saint-Amour and Gerard of Abbeville. First let's hear from the secular masters. [End Page 25]William of Saint-Amour and Gerard of AbbevilleWilliam of Saint-Amour comments on John 12:6 and argues that it does not permit begging and is the basis for the normative view that the apostles and their successors should have a money bag. He writes:Augustine, 'the Lord had a purse to keep the offerings... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Common Good and the Global Emergency: God and the Built Environment by T. J. GorringeLibby GibsonThe Common Good and the Global Emergency: God and the Built Environment T. J. Gorringe New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 309 pp. $90.00Building on arguments set forth in A Theology of the Built Environment: Justice, Empowerment, and Redemption (2002), theologian Timothy Gorringe begins The Common Good and the Global Emergency by (...) exploring whether an idea of the common good is relevant in a multicultural society and, if so, how an account of the common good can give rise to an alternative economic paradigm grounded in grace. While respect for cultural differences and the rise of individualism may argue against a robust understanding of the common good, Gorringe looks to the concept of oikonomia, or household management, to express the concept of managing “our affairs in such a way as to further what we perceive to be good ends” (35). Since our understanding of the economy shapes every aspect of the built environment, Gorringe traces local, regional, and national economies to what Wendell Berry calls “the great economy” or God’s creation, redemption, and sustenance of all things.Gorringe grounds his arguments about the common good in his Trinitarian theology of the built environment, expressed as God the Creator, God the Reconciler, and God the Redeemer. The triune perichoretic nature of God is inherently relational; therefore, as humans made in God’s image, we cannot ignore our interdependence. While God the Creator offers a sense of the common good springs from creation, God the Reconciler gives Gorringe traction to discuss the many barriers—race, gender, class, and space—that divide human beings and how our built environments structure these separations. God the Redeemer is concerned with empowering human beings to challenge all things that destroy life; thus Gorringe sees his project as contributing a theology of liberation committed to justice and fullness of life for all humans.Gorringe argues that our best chance to identify a common good rests on constructively addressing the common bad that he calls the global emergency. This emergency can be seen in the doubling of the world’s population in the past forty years, the problem of climate change, and global resource depletion. Seeing climate change and food, water, and energy issues as among the most pressing ethical issues of the coming decades, Gorringe challenges the reader to examine how our current common values have degraded the environment [End Page 202] and the lives of people worldwide. Since he specifically addresses the built environment, Gorringe’s purview is necessarily anthropocentric and justified by the doctrine of incarnation. Yet the Creator God expresses great wisdom in the laws of nature, and much could be learned from the “built” environments in the animal kingdom. While this line of thought would clearly depart from the rigorous academic method of Gorringe’s analysis, the book arose from a feeling that the Lord instructed him to continue working in this area, and attending to other nonrational sources of wisdom could greatly enhance our understanding of God’s grace in all the world.Gorringe acknowledges that the chapters do not unfold linearly, and that he seeks to point out points of confluence. The fluidity with which he addresses theological, political, economic, architectural, sociological, and ethical issues leads the reader to an overall picture of the common good and its powers to liberate us from injustice while an exact map of this process may be difficult to draw. Gorringe clearly and directly addresses both critics and supporters of his previous work on the built environment and solidifies his case for attending to the ways that our built environments could express a common good, grounded in grace, that allows for the fullness of life for all beings.Libby GibsonVirginia Theological SeminaryCopyright © 2013 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Avant de s'emparer de ce qu'elle sait, ou croit savoir, pour élaborer des théories, l'intelligence, lorsqu'elle s'éveille, est d'abord frappée par des évidences qui s'imposent à elle. A ce moment-là, l'intelligence est saisie, donc elle sort d'elle-même en s'ouvrant à la réalité, et elle en est consciente. Bref, elle tient une vérité. En même temps, ces lumières n'expliquent pas tout ;par conséquent, elles suscitent, tout naturellement, des questions. De là va naître ce que, à la suite de saint Thomas d'Aquin, (...) on a appelé :" la philosophie naturelle de l'esprit humain " qui, seule, peut nous délivrer, définitivement et objectivement, du relativisme et du vide, donc du désespoir. Point de départ de ces réflexions, la découverte de l'être et de sa nécessité dans l'évidence, intellectuelle qu'il y a quelque chose de bon et de beau en face de moi. A partir de là on discerne, certes, l'Erre perfection pure, mais surtout l'immatérialité de la connaissance, sans laquelle l'amour perd toute sa profondeur, et qui est le fondement de notre ressemblance à Dieu. C'est dire assez à quel point la foi suppose cette philosophie. Ces pages veulent s'adresser aux non-spécialistes, tout en essayant de répondre aux exigences de rigueur d'un esprit critique. Exercice difficile, mais à la hauteur de l'enjeu, exprimé de façon saisissante par Dimitri Karamazov :"Je suis fort peu instruit, frère, mais j'ai beaucoup songé à ces choses. Que de mystères accablent l'homme! Pénètre-les et reviens intact. ". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Denying the Body? Memory and the Dilemmas of History in DescartesTimothy J. ReissIn an essay first published in The New York Review of Books in January 1983, touching her apprenticeship as writer, the Barbadian /American novelist Paule Marshall described the long afternoon conversations with which her mother and friends used to relax in the family kitchen. She recalled how they saw things as composed of opposites; not torn, but (...) completed and made whole by them.Theirs was not a Manichean brand of dualism that sees matter, flesh, the body, as inherently evil, because they constantly addressed each other as “soully-gal”—soul: spirit; gal: the body, flesh, the visible self. And it was clear from their tone that they gave one as much weight and importance as the other. They had never heard of the mind/body split. 1This closing claim is surely less than self-evident. Whether or not the companions had heard of the mind/body split depends on the meaning given to the verb “hear.” Certainly it was embedded in their language, however much the phrase “soully-gal” might recombine its parts.Did the split come from Descartes and early European debates, linguistically colonizing all those who came within its sphere—Africans, Barbadians, Brooklynites? Did it come from a Christian heritage, with its haggling over bodily mortality and immortality of soul? Who knows? A first point is that it is still an everyday experience, deeply buried in language and so in the ideas, feelings, and meanings expressed in language. A second point is that the post-Cartesian debates—to simplify for a moment with an overly heavy [End Page 587] hand—were and are themselves but a variant within a much longer received wisdom. Nonetheless, such wisdom is now bound to that variant, which, willy-nilly, does give one set of parameters to a common experience—at least, to that of those of us who dwell under Western hegemonies. It gives them also, no doubt, to many who live within them at once less clearly and more contentiously.I would like to offer a further powerful instance here, simply to emphasize what and how much is at stake in the questions to be addressed. It occurs in a writing by the Guyanese novelist Wilson Harris, his Palace of the Peacock. First in a tetralogy, this novel recounts something like a journey away from a life of colonial and postcolonial violence and oppression towards a hoped-for rebirth in “fulfilment and understanding.” 2 Early on, the harsh protagonist, Donne, mocks the narrator, his mysterious “double” and “brother,” Dreamer, who has remarked their distance from “the folk.” “Is it a mystery of language and address?” asks Donne. Slightly bewildered, Dreamer struggles to suggest that the obstacle is less of language than of a deeper disjunction:“it’s an inapprehension of substance,” I blurted out, “an actual fear of the substance of life, fear of the substance of the folk, a cannibal blind fear in oneself. Put it how you like,” I cried, “it’s a fear of acknowledging the true substance of life. Yes, fear I tell you, the fear that breeds bitterness in our mouth, the haunting sense of fear that poisons us and hangs us and murders us. And somebody,” I declared, “must demonstrate the unity of being, and show...” I had grown violent and emphatic... “that fear is nothing but a dream and an appearance....” 3Recovery of unity might become a way to defeat political and historical violences. In the next novel in the sequence, one of two self-indulgently whining characters, accused of pining for a woman who has run away to seek education, explodes: “I don’t believe you can begin to see how some body like they born seeking for mind.” 4 For peoples of the colonized Americas, imbued with “the great civilization of the American Indian,” this urge, Harris then wrote in a critical essay, was simply the personal form of a social and political necessity to recover still-living elements of a culture for which “matter truly bore the imprint of genius,” refusing “the taboo of spirituality removed from sensuous direction.” 5 Recently, Harris has worried this... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms by James T. Bretzke, SJJohn J. FitzgeraldHandbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms James T. Bretzke, SJ washington, dc: georgetown university press, 2013. 260 pp. $24.95The Handbook of Roman Catholic Moral Terms continues the recent sequence of concise dictionaries published by Georgetown University Press, including the Key Words volumes for various religions and A Handbook of Bioethics Terms. James Bretzke’s contribution is especially (...) welcome as it is the first such English-language reference work in Catholic moral theology since the Second Vatican Council. The author covers fundamental, social, medical, and sexual issues while providing frequent cross-references and further readings. Special attention is also given to scripture and ethics, the history of moral theology, the nature and authority of the Magisterium, canon law, Protestant thought, and moral philosophy. The longest entries are those on dissent (67–70), Humanae vitae (111–16), infallibility (122–24), and the Pontifical Commission on Births (180–82), which in advance of Humanae vitae produced the well-known Majority Report favorable to the use of contraception. The sections on these vexed issues delve into some of the relevant arguments from different sides.Given its space constraints as a portable paperback, the Handbook covers an impressive amount of historical and contemporary ground. The eight-hundred-plus entries are generally clear and irenic, and often illuminating. Consider the page-long entry on just war theory (131–32), which succinctly summarizes its development from Augustine to the present-day Catechism, calls attention to the importance of ius post bellum alongside the traditional categories of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and outlines four possible critiques of the theory. Particularly helpful throughout are the various examples the author provides. For instance, in the course of explaining that moral norms and human laws may not bind at all times, he suggests that it is justifiable to forgo the duty to sustain life when this can only be done through extraordinary means (140), or to exceed the speed limit in case of a medical emergency (15, 81; see also 183 and 239–40 for other relevant examples).On the other hand, a few key topics are either overlooked or not fully dealt with. This book rightly highlights ecumenical ethics (77–78 and passim), but there is essentially no coverage of Eastern Orthodoxy and very little on pre-twentieth-century Protestant thought. In addition, considering the prevalence of a “morality-of-happiness” perspective in historical and modern-day Catholic thought, and given Bretzke’s own thorough attention to law, the book might have incorporated separate entries on happiness and grace, law’s complement. [End Page 221] (To his credit, he does mention grace several times—a fact that the preface points out—and includes the beatific vision, Gloria Dei vivens homo, and Summum Bonum among his definitions.) And speaking of law, the author’s treatment of the divine law is slightly confusing; he appears to alternately conflate it with and differentiate it from both the eternal law and the law of the Old and New Testaments (70–71, 136, 138).In the end, despite Bretzke’s best efforts to remain above the ideological frays of moral theology, one’s overall evaluation of his book may depend somewhat on one’s place within them. Some will chafe at his suggestions that contraception (116), certain forms of assisted reproduction (198–99), and artificial nutrition and hydration that sustain those in a persistent vegetative state (10, 224–25) remain open questions to an extent. Others will point out, as Bretzke does, that Church doctrine has previously undergone substantial development on other issues, such as religious freedom (65–66, 151, 193, 229) and the charging of interest (107, 241). What most should be able to agree upon is that in many respects the Handbook is a valuable resource, one that will help professionals and students alike come to a much better understanding of the key terms and debates within the field. [End Page 222]John J. FitzgeraldSt. John’s University (New York)Copyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Laws, & Gods: Magistrates & Ceremony in the Regulation of Public Lands in Republican RomeT. Corey BrennanGargola, D. J. Lands, Laws, & Gods: Magistrates & Ceremony in the Regulation of Public Lands in Republican Rome. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995. x 1 270 pp. Cloth, $43.95. (Studies in the History of Greece and Rome)“Nothing could have contributed more to the safety, strength and profit of (...) the state.” Thus Niccolò Machiavelli (Disc. II 6), one of the first of a long line of moderns to expatiate on the phenomenon of Roman Republican colonization. The latest (at time of writing) is D. J. G[argola], with his learned Lands, Laws, & Gods, which has its origins in the author’s 1989 University of North Carolina dissertation. The book takes as its general subject not just Republican colonization but also another well-trod area of Roman public policy—the agrarian legislation that distributed state land and regulated its use—as well as the religious and technical aspects of Roman land definition.Can we really expect much new on these traditional topics? Perhaps not, [End Page 143] especially now that we have Dieter Flach’s Römische Agrargeschichte (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 3.9, Munich 1990)—a masterly synthesis that G. oddly has missed. Yet G. independently manages to come up with a work of value. The bulk of G.’s book (chapters 2–7) consists of detailed reconstructions, especially from the evidence of Livy 21–45 (not much used by Flach), of how colonies were established, viritane plots assigned, and land sold or leased in the mid-Republic. Here G. has sifted through a small mountain of difficult evidence (and bibliography) of widely varying worth and succeeded in shaping a coherent narrative. He has a keen eye for technical and conventional language, and sound judgment on the limits of applying evidence from the various Gromatici (none of whom were writing much before the second century a.d.) to the Republican situation. In short, G. in these pages has crafted a reliable and readable English language work of reference on all sorts of res agrariae.The emphasis in chapters 2–7 is not so much on evolution in the administration of agrarian and colonial legislation—G. argues (somewhat provocatively) that there was not much development of institutions within this period—but on creating a composite picture of how things worked. G. realizes “the result is necessarily an idealized portrait,” in which the system appears more regular than it perhaps was (10–11). One additional trouble, however, is that this approach sometimes flattens potentially significant details. Take for instance the two commissions of colonial IIIviri created under a lex Aelia of late 194 (Liv. 34.53.1–2), one of which went on to found Copia (193), the other Valentia (192). Now, the reported terms of this law provided that the commissioners hold imperium—quite striking, though G. misses that detail—for three years (i.e., 193–91) to colonize the ‘ager Thurinus’ and the ‘Bruttii’ respectively. G. is over-optimistic in calling these territories “stable, long pacified regions” (63). If so, why the imperium? One possible explanation. The territorial parameters placed on each of these commissions (especially ‘the Bruttii’) were quite loose. Those IIIviri may have been expected to take wide-ranging measures to strengthen Roman control over dissidents in this area (cf. App. Hann. 61.252–53), even after they established their colonies. (Note that each of these commissions completed their ostensible tasks before their triennium expired.) If true, how many other colonial commissions were like these?It is only in chapters 8 and 9, where G. surveys agrarian programs from the Gracchi to the end of the Republic, that we see an attempt to show real development. The Gracchi in their agrarian legislation sought to achieve broader effects than any of their predecessors, argues G. in chapter 8, and so introduced agrarian laws that “ended the rigid separation of categories found in mid-Republican legislation” (176). Consider the lex Sempronia agraria of 133, which, in its final form, established IIIviri a(gris) i(udicandis) a(dsignandis) to settle coloni on public land taken from illegal possessores. In this law... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Tiny Person, Big ImpactT.S. MoranI met J on a Tuesday, the second day of my new job as the pediatric oncology social worker. Five days later, he died.Although J was 8 months old, he seemed tiny, like a preemie. When I saw him, he was snuggled into the shoulder of the attending physician. It was evident that one of his diagnoses was failure to thrive. He also had what (...) was thought to be a low-grade glioma of the optic pathway, and despite months of treatment, he was declining. It was clear that the team cared for J very much. They visited him, held him, played with him, and sang lullabies to him in Spanish. I was so impressed by their compassion.J had spent about half of his short life at the hospital. He was born prematurely to a young mother, herself in foster care. His mother had numerous obstacles preventing her from visiting often and it did not seem that she bonded well with him. J's mother stated that her boyfriend discouraged her from visiting. She did not have transportation and declined offers of hospital-funded Uber rides. She had little prenatal care or education about becoming a mother.J's mother seemed guarded in her interactions; hesitant to reveal anything that might show her vulnerability. The team was frustrated as it seemed she was not receptive to their efforts. The team was also concerned that she did not fully understand J's condition due to her poor health literacy, despite the use of a certified language interpreter. Still, when she did visit, she was kind and caring and stated that she did not want her foster mother involved in providing J's care.Part of my job was to help prepare the family for discharge to home. I had been speaking to their caseworker from Child Protective Services. She was a strong advocate for both mother and baby. After several meetings with the team that included J's mother and the caseworker, J's mother accepted his prognosis. She was willing to provide care at home with hospice support. She came to the unit several times that week to receive training about his care needs. The hospice nursing visit was scheduled, and J and his mother left the hospital on a Friday.The caseworker called on Monday to tell us that J had passed away peacefully on Sunday. The reaction on the unit was palpable. New residents and seasoned chiefs were teary-eyed and sighing. To some, it seemed like a relief. Given the team's extraordinary care and concern shown to this family, I was not surprised by their emotions.What surprised me was my level of grief. I had spent the 12 years prior serving adult hospice patients; I understood end-of-life care and death's eventuality. I thought I was well prepared. This experience was different from my past. I was able to cope with an adult patient's passing without much distress, accepting that most adults had lived a full life.I felt grief for the team who had invested in J, and for his short life filled with illness and pain. I felt grief for his mother, who had experienced a horrific childhood, had lost her innocence too young, and had been robbed of the opportunity to experience joyful parenting. [End Page 82]The chief recognized the team's need for support and quickly organized a "debriefing." A lot of the team participated, even those who only had brief contact with J. Everyone had a chance to reflect on their experience in caring for this child. Because of my hospice training, I was included. I validated their loss, their efforts, and their love for J. I provided basic grief education, enumerating their possible reactions of sadness, anger, frustration, fatigue, confusion, or numbness, and this helped me to feel like I also contributed to his care. I encouraged self-care—from taking time off, to lingering over an extra cup of tea, to speaking about their experience with me or another social worker.When I spoke about my feelings to my coworkers, they were understanding and acknowledged... (shrink)

R T Allen; The Meaning of Life and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 25, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 47–58, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9.

The pregnant phrase fatale monstrum comes at a crucial point in the third and longest of the three sentences of the ‘Cleopatra Ode’. Before it Cleopatra is being hissed from the stage of history with cries of disapproval; after it she is recalled to receive plaudit after plaudit for her courage and resolution. The phrase is emphasized by its position at the start of a stanza followed by a marked pause. Prima facie it is the climax of the vituperation, and (...) has often so been taken. T. E. Page, for example, comments: ‘Horace speaks of Cleopatra as not human, but a hideous and portentous creature sent by destiny to cause horror and alarm.’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.4 (2000) 549-557 [Access article in PDF] Cato Orationes 66 and the Case Against M.' Acilius Glabrio In 189 B.C.E. J. Bradford Churchill THE RACE FOR THE CENSORSHIP of 189 became the setting for one of the most dramatic domestic political disputes of the early second century. 1 M. Porcius Cato (cos. 195) was seeking the censorship, and among his competitors was another homo novus, (...) M.' Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191). Now, Cato had served as tribunus militum under the consul Glabrio during the campaign of 191 against Antiochus III in Greece. Cato had led a flanking expedition to decide the battle at Thermopylae, at the conclusion of which the king's camp was invaded and plundered. 2 Cato said that after the battle, Glabrio had embraced him and cried out that neither he nor the Roman people could repay his good services. 3 Glabrio sent Cato home with news of the victory. 4Now, in the race for the censorship of 189, public opinion was inclining in favor of Glabrio because he had conducted a lavish distribution of congiaria--vessels, perhaps precious, filled with wine or oil. The nobles among the competitors took umbrage at his being preferred to them, and two tribunes, P. Sempronius Gracchus and C. Sempronius Rutilus, brought Glabrio to trial on the charge "that there was some amount of the royal money and booty taken in the camp of Antiochus which he had neither carried in the triumph nor deposited in the treasury." 5 Legates and military tribunes were called to testify, and most visible among them was Cato, who had a reputation for integrity, but [End Page 549] because he was testifying against an opponent in a political race, his influence was diminished. The substance of Cato's testimony, as Livy summarized it, was that he had seen some gold and silver vessels among the royal booty at the sack of the camp, and had not seen them in the triumph.Glabrio withdrew from the race after a fine had been proposed and twice argued, and the case lapsed. He vilified Cato as a perjurious hypocrite for attacking a fellow homo novus for something the nobles usually passed over in silence. 6We have a fragment of a speech Cato gave against Glabrio, and his trial is the only appropriate occasion which is known to us. The fragment itself is clearly designed to set up a contrast between Cato and Glabrio, but the text is corrupt. The codex Farnesianus of Festus has the following entry (Fest. p. 268L): Penatores: qui penus gestant. Cato adversus M.' Acilium quarta: "postquam nativitas ex navibus eduxi, non ex militibus atque nautis piscatores penatores fici, sed arum dedi." First there are several problems which are relatively minor and no longer yield much controversy. The word quarta indicates there were at least four speeches "against Acilius." More often than not, this is dismissed as a simple error. 7 The word nativitas is clearly foreign to the context, and was long ago emended to navitas, as a poetic and archaic variant on nautas. 8 The transmitted fici is regularly and reasonably emended to feci. 9 [End Page 550]The more difficult question centers on the phrase sed arum dedi. André Dacier, in an early modern edition of Festus (Amsterdam 1700), emended arum to aurum. 10 Much later, Theodor Mommsen offered the conjecture arma. 11 This is now the prevailing reading, accepted most significantly by Enrica Malcovati (1953, 39) in the authoritative edition of the Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta. 12 Maria Teresa Sblendorio Cugusi (1982, 77), following Lindsay (1913, 268), printed and obelized arum, but in her commentary (1982, 215) considered Mommsen's emendation preferable to Dacier's because the latter "appears inconsistent with the context." I intend to show that this is rather the opposite of the case, and we ought to accept Dacier's emendation. 13With Mommsen's conjecture, the passage reads: "When I brought sailors off the ships, I didn't make fishers and provisioners out of soldiers... (shrink)

R T Allen; Metaphysics in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 23, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 159–169, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.198.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 126-127 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment T. J. Hochstrasser. Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 246. Cloth, $54.95. In a worthy addition to Cambridge's Ideas in Context series, T. J. Hochstrasser undertakes an excavation. His aim is to provide a description, and to (...) demonstrate the importance within the German Frühaufklärung, of a largely forgotten philosophical approach: eclecticism. Hochstrasser argues that the triumph of Wolffian rationalism in the Protestant universities in the middle of the eighteenth century occluded the importance of eclecticism for Kant, who in turn occluded it for everyone afterward. But the price of forgetting eclecticism is high. Not only are we left with no account--or a skewed account--of the development of German thought from the first stirrings of the Enlightenment to the emergence of the Critical philosophy, but our understanding of the development of the historiography of philosophy is badly compromised. For among their many accomplishments--in natural jurisprudence, in university reform--the eclectics were the first critical historians of philosophy, their distinctive genres being historically aware treatises on natural law and Whig histories of natural jurisprudence. Hochstrasser's study traces the development of eclecticism, from the work of its founders, Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius, through a devolution in the hands of Thomasius's later disciples, to the eventual oblivion in the middle of the eighteenth century. This review will focus on the beginning of this narrative, as Pufendorf is the leading figure in the book.Eclecticism began with Pufendorf's attempt, in his mature work on natural law, to reconcile his conflicting inheritances from Grotius and Hobbes without simply endorsing the work of either. He was impressed both by Grotius's explanation of the law of nations in terms of human sociability--but also by Hobbes's criticisms of Grotius, rooted in the latter's analysis of the state of nature. At the same time, he wished to reject Grotius's method of induction from sociological observation and Hobbes's minimally constrained voluntarism. Contributing further to his perplexity was his increasing disaffection from the geometric approach he had adopted in his Elementa Jurisprudentiae Universalis.The way out of this impasse, Hochstrasser contends, was revealed to Pufendorf in correspondence with Hermann Conring, the leading constitutional lawyer of his time, and Johann Böcler, Grotius's most erudite commentator. Böcler chastised Pufendorf for his neglect of history, and both of Pufendorf's correspondents pointed out his need for some non-Hobbesian criterion by which he could validate his first principles, whatever they turned out to be. Stung particularly by Böcler's remarks, Pufendorf returned to the Stoics and there discovered a via media between Hobbes's pessimism and Grotius's optimism: a synthesis anticipating Kant's doctrine of "unsocial sociability." For the purposes of Hochstrasser's study, the key aspects of Pufendorf's solution are these: first, it avoids mere voluntarism; second, it does this by means of a moral epistemology that sharply distinguishes natural law [End Page 126] from moral theology; finally, the validating criterion for Pufendorf's first principles is located in critical appropriation of the history of moral philosophy. These were to be hallmarks of Pufendorf's school.On the first and second points, Hochstrasser seems to me substantively correct, though I think he misunderstands the nature of Pufendorf's escape from mere voluntarism and thereby underplays the religious dimensions of Pufendorf's theory. Among recent Anglo-American commentators on Pufendorf, only Robert Adams has in my view properly construed Pufendorf's thought: that it involves a command theory of obligation proper, but posits the natural advantageousness of some hierarchies as a buttress against mere voluntarism. Hochstrasser is thus right to insist, against Leibniz, that Pufendorf's account of obligation is coherent. But he is wrong to suggest that "there was nothing in Pufendorf's theory... to oblige him to introduce fear of punishment by a superior... " (105). He is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 49-75 [Access article in PDF] Sensible Ends:Latent Teleology in Descartes' Account of Sensation Alison Simmons One of Descartes' hallmark contributions to natural philosophy is his denunciation of teleology. It is puzzling, then, to find him arguing in Meditation VI that human beings have sensations in order to preserve the union of mind and body (AT VII 83). 1 This appears to (...) be just the sort of teleological explanation that he proscribes. Descartes' Anglo-American commentators have had little to say about the teleological overtones of his claims about sensation. His French commentators acknowledge these overtones, but seem largely untroubled by them. 2 It is worth pausing to be troubled, for a closer analysis reveals that Descartes' famous proscription against teleology is not as simple as it is generally thought to be. In the first half of this essay, I argue that Descartes advocates a genuinely teleological conception of the senses. My aim is not to charge Descartes with employing illicit teleology, but to argue that there is a place for teleology even in his revisionist natural philosophy. Accordingly, in the second half of this essay, I argue that Descartes' assault on teleological explanation is [End Page 49] not a sweeping assault on finality, but a more directed attack on particular uses of ends in natural philosophy. Descartes' assault leaves standing a form of teleological explanation that proves crucial to his own treatment of sensation. 1. Descartes' Rejection of Teleological Explanation at a Glance A teleological explanation is one that purports to account for something in terms of its ends or its function relative to the ends of the system of which it is a part. Aristotle's physics provides many classic examples: plants produce leaves for the protection of their fruit; spiders spin webs in order to catch food; animals grow sharp front teeth and dull back teeth in order to facilitate biting and chewing respectively; eyes are for seeing. According to Aristotle, all natural phenomena are directed toward ends and no explanation is complete without a teleological component that specifies the end for the sake of which the phenomenon occurs. Indeed ends take explanatory priorityover other causes: "Both causes [the end and the matter] must be stated by the student of nature, but especially the end; for that is the cause of the matter, not vice versa." 3 And: [T]he causes concerned in natural generation are, as we see, more than one. There is the cause for the sake of which [the end], and the cause whence the beginning of motion comes [the efficient cause]. Now we must decide which of these two causes comes first, which second. Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call that for the sake of which. For this is the account of the thing, and the account forms the starting-point.4In other words, Aristotle argues that natural substances have the matter they do, have the parts or organs they do, are organized as they are and act as they do for the sake of their ends. To explain why things are as they are, the natural philosopher must therefore explain the ways in which they contribute to ends.Among the late scholastic Aristotelians familiar to Descartes there is considerable debate concerning the causal efficacy of ends. Genuine final causation, in which something is said to be acted on by an end, is limited to the intentional behavior of rational agents who consciously recognize their ends: only something that recognizes an end can be "moved" by one. Even here the sort of causation involved is peculiar: a rational agent is "moved" by an end insofar as the end induces a "metaphorical motion" toward (or desire for) the end in the agent's will. 5 While these scholastic Aristotelians resist attributing final causation [End Page 50] to non-rational creatures, they nevertheless persist in attributing ends to them. When Toletus, Rubio, the Coimbrans and Suarez take up the question whether nature acts propter finem, each answers it affirmatively: natural... (shrink)